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The U.S. detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, has be-
come synonymous with arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and other 
abuses committed during the “war on terror.”  Since January 2002, 
the United States has imprisoned more than 775 individuals at Guan-
tánamo; 171 remain detained.
1
  Following his inauguration, President 
Obama ordered Guantánamo’s closure, explaining that the prison 
has undermined America’s values and reputation, while likely creat-
ing more terrorists than it ever incapacitated.
2
  A political backlash, 
however, stymied plans for the prison’s closure, and Guantánamo 
remains as controversial today as it was when the first prisoners were 
brought there almost a decade ago.  This issue is dedicated to the 
symposium held last year at Seton Hall Law School entitled National 
Security Policy and the Role of Lawyering: Guantánamo and Beyond, 
which addressed important legal and ethical issues raised by Guantá-
namo.  
The purpose of bringing prisoners to Guantánamo was to detain 
them outside the law.  Although the United States exercises total, ex-
clusive, and permanent control over the naval base, Guantánamo re-
mains formally under Cuban sovereignty.
3
  For the architects of 
America’s “war on terror,” Guantánamo offered several attractions: a 
place over which the United States had total power but, due to an ab-
sence of sovereignty, could seek to evade accountability and judicial 
review.  The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this argument, ruling 
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 1 The Detainees—The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
 2 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security at the 
National Archives (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-
National-Security-5-21-09/. 
 3 See Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 35-40 
(2004). 
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that Guantánamo detainees have a right to habeas corpus.
4
  However, 
that right was established only after protracted legal battles, and, for 
years, the United States government succeeded in holding detainees 
at Guantánamo without access to lawyers or to the courts while em-
ploying highly coercive interrogation techniques that bordered on, 
and in some instances amounted to, torture.
5
 
From its inception, secrecy pervaded virtually every aspect of 
Guantánamo.  For years, the United States refused to disclose even 
the names of the men it was holding there, let alone the basis for 
their detention.  It denied prisoners access to their families, con-
ducted closed hearings to determine if prisoners were “enemy com-
batants,” and sought to conceal illegal interrogation methods by 
deeming them classified. Secrecy, in short, served as a means to avoid 
accountability, hide mistakes, and perpetuate the myth that, as Bush 




Lawyers, journalists, and nongovernment organizations have 
fought during the last decade to lift the veil of secrecy from Guantá-
namo.  None has been more important and influential in this truth-
seeking process than the Seton Hall University School of Law’s Cen-
ter for Policy and Research (the “Center”).  In 2006, the Center pub-
lished its first report, Report on Guantánamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 
Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data.
7
  Relying solely 
on publicly available documents, this groundbreaking report pro-
vided both a more complete picture of the detainees and a counter-
narrative to the Bush administration’s claim that everyone at Guantá-
namo was a dangerous terrorist.  The report finds, for example, 
that—according to the government’s own data—a large majority of detai-
nees did not participate in combat against the United States, only 
eight percent of detainees were al Qaeda fighters, and more than half 
of the detainees had no definitive connection with al Qaeda.
8
  The 
report, which received wide media attention, had a far-reaching im-
 
 4 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that Guantánamo de-
tainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus under the Suspension Clause); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that Guantánamo detainees have a right 
to habeas corpus under federal statute). 
 5 See generally JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING 
AMERICA’S NEW GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM (2011). 
 6 See Ken Ballen & Peter Bergen, The Worst of the Worst?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 20, 
2008), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/10/19/the_worst_of_the_worst. 
 7 Mark Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantánamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees 
Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  1211 (2011).  
 8 Id. at 1212, 1218. 
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pact, one that still informs public debate about Guantánamo today.  
The report helped alter the public perception of Guantánamo, un-
derscoring the arbitrary and lawless nature of the detentions there. 
Under the leadership of Professor Mark Denbeaux, the Center 
has since 2006 published seventeen Guantánamo reports, with more 
still anticipated.  Six of these reports are included in this symposium 
edition.  In addition to the first report profiling the detainees, the 
reports published here include No-Hearing Hearings: An Analysis of the 
Proceedings of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo, 
which exposes the flaws in the military tribunals created by the Bush 
administration to avoid judicial review.
9
  As the report details, these 
tribunals—known as Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)—
denied detainees access to the evidence against them, routinely re-
fused detainee requests to call witnesses, and provided “personal rep-
resentatives” rather than attorneys who met only briefly with detai-
nees and who, in some cases, advocated against them.
10
  By providing 
a comprehensive account of the CSRTs’ failings, the report helped 
lay the groundwork for the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Boume-




Another report, The Guantánamo Detainees During Detention: Data 
From Defense Department Records, challenges the government’s one-
sided account of detainee behavior at Guantánamo.
12
  The report 
concludes that, government statements to the contrary, detainees 
posed a much greater danger to themselves than to their guards.
13
  
The report helped expose the government’s effort to characterize 
desperate actions by detainees, including attempted suicides, as “in-
jurious self-manipulative behavior”
14
 to avoid its responsibility for de-
teriorating conditions at Guantánamo. 
In Profile of Released Guantánamo Detainees: The Government’s Story 
Then and Now, the Center took on the important issue of detainee re-
cidivism,
15
 which is often invoked to prevent the release of detainees 
 
 9 Mark Denbeaux et al., No-Hearing Hearings: An Analysis of the Proceedings of the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  1231 (2011). 
 10 Id. at 1235. 
 11 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 12 Mark Denbeaux et al., The Guantánamo Detainees During Detention: Data From De-
fense Department Records, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  1269  (2011). 
 13 See id. at 1269. 
 14 See id. at 1279–85. 
 15 Mark Denbeaux et al., Profile of Released Guantánamo Detainees: The Government’s 
Story Then and Now, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  1287 (2011). 
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from Guantánamo.  The report finds that a detainee’s nationality, ra-
ther than a careful assessment of the evidence, was the critical factor 
in determining who was released from Guantánamo.
16
  It thus un-
derscores the dangers an extrajudicial detention system like Guantá-
namo poses—not only to those it mistakenly sweeps up, but to Ameri-
ca’s counter-terrorism efforts as well. 
Two other reports deal more specifically with interrogations at 
Guantánamo. Captured on Tape: Interrogation and Videotaping of Detai-
nees at Guantánamo reveals that more than 24,000 interrogations have 
been conducted at Guantánamo, all of which were videotaped.
17
  
While many tapes have been destroyed, the report notes that some 
may still exist, and urges that steps be taken to avoid their future de-
struction.
18
  Torture Who Knew? An Analysis of the FBI and Department of 
Defense Reactions to Harsh Interrogation Methods at Guantánamo finds that 
the Department of Defense effectively ignored FBI reports document-
ing hundreds of instances of improper conduct by Defense Depart-
ment interrogators at Guantánamo.
19
  The report thus sheds light not 
only on the mistreatment of detainees at Guantánamo, but also on 
the continuing absence of accountability for those abuses. 
The Center’s reports have played a vital role in shaping the pub-
lic’s understanding of Guantánamo, providing a more complete and 
accurate picture of the prison.  The reports also offer a model for law 
school student involvement, offering hundreds of students an oppor-
tunity to apply their research skills to some of the most pressing issues 
of the day.  The significance of the Guantánamo reports, however, 
transcends their impact on current debate.  The reports compile, 
preserve, and analyze a wealth of information about Guantánamo 
that will be studied by generations of scholars and researchers to 
come—information, that but for the reports, would likely be lost to 
history. 
* * * 
Many issues addressed in the reports are also the subject of the 
articles and essays published alongside them in this issue.  As the re-
ports suggest, Guantánamo is replete with irony and contradiction.  
Among them, is the irony that being prosecuted for war crimes in a 
 
 16 Id. at 1291. 
 17 Mark Denbeaux et al., Captured on Tape: Interrogation and Videotaping of Detainees 
at Guantánamo, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  1307, 1308–09 (2011). 
 18 Id. at 1315–16. 
 19 Mark Denbeaux et al., Torture Who Knew? An Analysis of the FBI and Department of 
Defense Reactions to Harsh Interrogation Methods at Guantánamo, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  
1319, 1336–37(2011). 
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military commission can prove the fastest way to gain release from the 
detention center.  Joshua L. Dratel’s piece, How I Learned to Stop Wor-
rying and Love the Military Commissions, explores this contradiction.
20
 
Dratel, a prominent criminal defense attorney, previously 
represented David Hicks, one of the first people charged before a 
military commission at Guantánamo.  As a result of a plea deal, Hicks 
was returned to Australia to serve a nine-month sentence.
21
  In his es-
say, Dratel explains how civilian defense counsel’s experiences litigat-
ing in a properly constituted criminal court system enable them to 
expose the inadequacies of military commissions.22  
The main purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to deter-
mine whether a prisoner is wrongfully held.  But, in order for a court 
to make that determination, the government must first provide it with 
sufficient information about the prisoner and the basis for his con-
finement.  This information-disclosing function of habeas is the sub-
ject of Jon Connolly and Marc D. Falkoff’s article, Habeas, Informa-
tional Asymmetries, and the War on Terror.
23
  Connolly and Falkoff 
explain the important role habeas plays in promoting transparency 
by increasing the available information about detainees.
24
  They argue 
for a robust interpretation of the government’s disclosure obliga-




Lawyers for detainees have played a critical role in helping ex-
pose abuses at Guantánamo.  Lawyers nevertheless still operate under 
significant restrictions, which are imposed as a condition of their 
gaining access to their clients. Those restrictions are described in 
Shayana Kadidal’s Confronting Ethical Issues in National Security Cases: 
the Guantánamo Habeas Litigation.
26
  Kadidal explores the ethical di-
lemma and risks involved in representing detainees in habeas pro-
ceedings.27  He describes, for example, how classification review of at-
 
 20 Joshua L. Dratel, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Military Commis-
sions, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  1339 (2011). 
 21 William Glaberson, Australian  Guantánamo Gets 9 Months, N.Y. TIMES,(Mar. 31, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/world/americas/31iht-web0331-
hicks.5095543.html. 
 22  See Dratel, supra note 20. 
 23 Jon Connolly & Marc D. Falkoff, Habeas, Informational Asymmetries, and the War 
on Terror, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  1361(2011). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 1382–85. 
 26 Shayana Kadidal, Confronting Ethical Issues in National Security Cases: The Guantá-
namo Habeas Litigation, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1397 (2011). 
 27  See id. 
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torney-client communications threatens the presumptive confiden-
tiality of those communications and how lawyers for high-value detai-
nees, in particular, are restricted in their ability to share information 
with one another because they must notify the government what spe-
cific information they would like to share.
28
  Kadidal also explains 
how advocating for detainee clients can expose habeas attorneys to 
the risk of criminal prosecution for material support for terrorism.
29
  
Kadidal ultimately questions whether Guantánamo habeas attorneys 




James A. Cohen looks at another set of obstacles to representing 
Guantánamo detainees.  In Lawyering in a Vacuum, Cohen describes 
the challenges lawyers face in developing the type of attorney-client 
relationship necessary for effective representation.
31
  As Cohen ex-
plains, many Guantánamo detainees were illegally imprisoned and 
grossly mistreated even before they were brought to Guantánamo.
32
  
Additionally, cultural barriers exist between lawyers and Muslim de-
tainee clients that can breed distrust of both the American legal sys-
tem and those lawyers—a situation exacerbated by harsh and decep-
tive tactics used by the U.S. military, prison rules and policies, and the 
government’s disregard of the attorney-client privilege.
33
  Further, dif-
ficulties communicating with clients have sometimes led lawyers to 
substitute a more paternalistic model for a client-centered approach 
to representation.
34
  Cohen concludes by suggesting some ways in 
which attorneys can mitigate these harms, including by more sensitive 




Stephen I. Vladeck’s The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene provides 
a timely analysis of the ongoing Guantánamo habeas litigation.
36
  Vla-
deck examines the growing body of lower-court decisions issued in 
individual habeas cases since the Supreme Court recognized the de-
 
 28 Id. at 1398–402, 1404–06. 
 29 Id. at 1414–20. 
 30 Id. at 1426. 
 31 James A. Cohen, Lawyering in a Vacuum, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  1427 (2011). 
 32 See id. at 1431, 1435. 
 33 Id. at 1433–34. 
 34 Id. at 1443. 
 35 Id. at 1451. 
 36 Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.  
1451 (2011). 
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tainees’ constitutional right to habeas more than three years ago.
37
  
Vladeck focuses in particular on the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of 
the substantive standard for detention under the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (AUMF),
38
 the procedural and evidentiary rules 
governing their cases, and the availability of remedies from unlawful 
detention.
39
  Vladeck concludes that, while not entirely inconsistent 
with Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit’s decisions reveal some resistance to 




In “Damages or Nothing”: The Post-Boumediene Constitution and 
Compensation for Human Rights Violations After 9/11, Elizabeth Wilson 
examines another feature of post-9/11 detainee litigation: the ability 
of victims of torture and other abuses to seek a civil damages remedy 
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
41
 the 1971 Su-
preme Court decision holding that individuals can sue federal offi-
cials for constitutional violations.
42
  In Boumediene, Wilson explains, 
the Supreme Court appeared to recognize that constitutional protec-
tions could apply extraterritorially even to noncitizens.
43
  Wilson ar-
gues, however, that the Supreme Court has demonstrated no desire 
to extend this broader vision of the Constitution beyond the habeas 
corpus context, thus precluding compensation for even the most 
egregious constitutional violations.
44
   
A decade after 9/11, we are still trying to make sense of Guantá-
namo.  Seton Hall University School of Law’s Guantánamo reports 
provide an invaluable resource for anyone who wishes to understand 
the prison’s impact on the United States and the world.  The reports 
have greatly enhanced our knowledge about U.S. policies in the “war 
on terror” and will be studied by scholars, journalists, and others for 
generations to come.  The articles and essays in this symposium issue 
similarly provide a window into numerous issues raised by Guantá-
namo. Like the reports, the articles and essays help put into perspec-
tive the evolving legacy of the United States’ most infamous prison. 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
 39 Vladeck, supra note 36. 
 40 See id. at 1488–89. 
 41 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 42 Elizabeth A. Wilson, “Damages or Nothing”: The Post-Boumediene Constitution and 
Compensation for Human Rights Violations after 9/11, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1491 
(2011). 
 43 See id. at 1495–96. 
 44 See id. at 1592–93. 
